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Abstract
This article reports the results of a laboratory experiment that examines
the strategic eﬀect of forward contracts on market power in inﬁnitely repeated
duopolies. Two competing eﬀects motivate the experimental design. Allaz and
Vila (1993) argue that forward markets act like additional competitors in that
they increase quantity competition among ﬁrms. Conversely, Liski and Mon-
tero (2006) argue that forward contracting can facilitate collusive outcomes by
enabling ﬁrms to soften competition. The experiment provides a ﬁrst simulta-
neous test of these rival eﬀects. Contrary to previous experimental studies, the
results do not support the quantity-competition eﬀect. Further, the ﬁndings
provide evidence in support of the collusive hypothesis.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C91, D43, L13, Q49
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly, Collusion, Experiments, Forward markets, Elec-
tricity markets
1 Introduction
Antitrust authorities and researchers have a profound interest in the factors that de-
termine the likelihood of collusion. Extensive theoretical and empirical work focuses
on the determinants of ﬁrms' coordinated eﬀorts to achieve proﬁts in excess of the
competitive outcome. Most empirical studies are experimental as strategic ﬁeld data
is diﬃcult to obtain and identiﬁcation of speciﬁc factors can be challenging due to
interactions and unobservables. Controlled laboratory experiments, however, allow
targeted tests in market environments that satisfy the assumptions of the underly-
ing model of interest. This article studies the eﬀect of forward contracts on tacit
collusion in duopolies with quantity-setting ﬁrms.
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy or sell a ﬁxed
quantity at a speciﬁed time in the future at a price agreed upon today. Historically,
forward contracts have played an important role in commodity markets and more
recently in ﬁnancial asset markets. Forward contracts have also become increasingly
important in electricity wholesale markets. Forward trading is a prevalent instrument
in hedging risk: forwards contracts allow buyers and sellers to potentially oﬀset
unfavorable price movements in the spot market by shifting risk to less risk-averse
market participants.
However, Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) hypothesize that even in the
absence of risk and uncertainty, forward markets can emerge and will lead to more
market eﬃciency. The underlying intuition is that quantity-setting ﬁrms will sell
some of their production forward to improve their position relative to competitors
in the spot market. In the spot market, ﬁrms will then compete over the residual
demand. Firms will ﬁnd themselves in a prisoner's dilemma type situation: Although
ﬁrms would be jointly better oﬀ by avoiding selling in advance, it is beneﬁcial to
an individual ﬁrm to do so (Stackelberg leadership advantage). As a result, each
ﬁrm produces more than in the absence of forward markets, which reduces their
market power. Following the Western U.S. energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, this pro-
competitive prediction led to suggestions to remove restrictions on forward contracts
with the goal of limiting the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power.
The pro-competitive hypothesis assumes that oligopolists only compete with each
other a limited number of times. Competing theories relax this assumption and
derive hypotheses that challenge the pro-competitive argument. According to the
Friedman (Folk) theorem, there are multiple equilibria in an inﬁnitely repeated set-
ting: Ferreira (2003) shows that if ﬁrms are able to sell their production in inﬁnitely
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many forward phases prior to the spot market, forward contracts can have an anti-
competitive eﬀect. Mahenc and Salanié (2004) show that when ﬁrms compete over
prices of slightly diﬀerentiated products, ﬁrms will take long positions in the for-
ward market which will lead to higher prices and thus higher proﬁts compared to
oligopolistic markets without forward markets. Liski and Montero (2006) study the
eﬀect of forward contracts in an inﬁnitely repeated oligopoly; the authors demon-
strate that forward markets enable quantity-setting ﬁrms to soften competition more
than they could in the absence of forward markets. In particular, when ﬁrms repeat-
edly interact both in forward and spot markets, the existence of forward markets
yields a wider range of discount rates which allow for the collusive equilibrium. The
gains from deviating from the collusive path are never greater than the gains in
an inﬁnitely repeated oligopoly without forward markets, and the proﬁts from the
ensuing sanctioning equilibrium (Allaz and Vila equilibrium) are less than the prof-
its from the sanctioning equilibrium in the absence of forward contracts (standard
Cournot equilibrium). The focus of this article is to investigate whether forward
sales yield strategic eﬀects in an inﬁnitely repeated Cournot setting. In particular,
we test the collusive hypothesis of Liski and Montero against the pro-competitive
hypothesis of Allaz and Vila in a controlled laboratory experiment1.
Previous experimental studies on the two-phase forward model of Allaz and Vila
report results that support the pro-competitive prediction. In a ﬁnitely repeated
two-phase Cournot setting with ﬁxed matching, Le Coq and Orzen (2006) ﬁnd that
a forward trading phase leads to increases in market eﬃciency. However, the pro-
competitive eﬀect is less pronounced than predicted by theory. Van Koten and
Ortmann (2011) use a similar experimental design with producers' cost functions
that resemble electricity generators more closely. Their ﬁndings also suggest that
introduction of a forward market lowers market prices through increased aggregate
output. Brandts et al. (2008) report that both in settings with quantity competition
and supply-function competition, forward markets lead to reductions in market prices
and thus yield greater market eﬃciency. The authors also use a ﬁnitely repeated
protocol with ﬁxed matching. Ferreira et al. (2010) test the strategic eﬀects of
forward markets in quantity competition settings with ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely many
forward trading phases with random re-matching of subjects after each round. In
the ﬁnitely repeated treatments, their ﬁndings support the competitive hypothesis
of Allaz and Vila. Further, the authors do not ﬁnd evidence of collusive outcomes
1Note that repeated play of the Allaz and Vila stage-game strategy is one of many subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies in an inﬁnitely repeated setting.
3
in the treatments with inﬁnitely many forward markets.
Liski and Montero (2006) predict that several strategies can yield the collusive
equilibrium in the presence of forward markets. However, previous experimental
studies use a pricing rule that signiﬁcantly reduces the set of possible collusive strate-
gies: The forward pricing rule dictates a forward price that is less than or equal to
the spot price - the forward price is equal to the spot price if and only if ﬁrms ei-
ther play the pro-competitive strategy or jointly refrain from selling forward. This
pricing rule also introduces uncertainty about price diﬀerences between forward and
spot market phases which leads to interaction of strategic and risk hedging motives.
To allow for multiple collusive equilibria and to eliminate price uncertainty eﬀects,
the experimental design in this article strictly imposes forward-spot price parity. We
achieve this by restricting ﬁrms' quantity choices to a discrete choice set. The pos-
sible choices reﬂect diﬀerent pure strategies in the quantity-setting stage-game. The
set of limited strategies also increases the likelihood of collusive outcomes (see Holt
(1995)).
We compare the market outcomes of a two-phase duopoly with forward trading
to the results of a standard, one-phase duopoly. Speciﬁcally, we examine diﬀerences
in collusive behavior between these two treatments. The collusive hypothesis pre-
dicts that multiple collusive equilibria can emerge in the two-phase duopoly. We
investigate stage-game outcomes in the spot market phase (conditional on forward
phase outcomes) to test for diﬀerences in forward trading between colluding and non-
colluding ﬁrms. To compare the competitive eﬀect of market entry to the eﬀect of
forward markets, we report the diﬀerences in market eﬃciency between a three-ﬁrm
oligopoly and the two-phase duopoly.
The main result of this article is that, contrary to previous experimental ﬁndings,
introducing a forward market in a duopoly may not increase market eﬃciency. The
pro-competitive hypothesis predicts that the eﬀect of a forward market is equivalent
to squaring the number of ﬁrms. However, we ﬁnd that one additional competitor
signiﬁcantly limits market power in a duopoly whereas a forward market does not.
Further, we provide evidence that allowing ﬁrms to trade forward can facilitate
collusion as predicted by Liski and Montero's collusive hypothesis.
The organization of the remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents
the predictions of the pro-competitive and collusive theories and derives the hypothe-
ses which guide the experimental design. Section 3 describes the experimental design
and procedures. Section 4 presents the results of the article, and Section 5 discusses
the main ﬁndings.
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2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
We will ﬁrst derive the pro-competitive predictions of the stage-game and then con-
trast them to the collusive predictions of the inﬁnitely repeated game. Notice that,
according to the Folk theorem, repeated play of the stage-game equilibrium strategy
is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the inﬁnitely repeated game. In the
following derivation, we only consider a single forward market opening prior to the
spot market (for a detailed derivation with multiple forward market openings, see
Allaz and Vila (1993); Ferreira (2003)).
Competitive Framework
Standard Cournot Game
First, consider a single phase Cournot game with J ﬁrms that compete over quantity.
Without loss of generality, assume symmetric ﬁrms with zero production cost. For
simplicity, let the inverse demand function be given by
p (q) = α−
J∑
j=1
qj (2.1)
where qj denotes ﬁrm j's output. The single period, unique Nash equilibrium is
given by
qcj =
α
J + 1
; picj =
α2
(J + 1)2
; ∀j; pc = α
J + 1
(2.2)
where pij denotes ﬁrm j's proﬁts. Backward induction implies that the same one-shot
game predictions hold in a ﬁnitely repeated game.
Two-Phase Cournot Game
Now consider a two-phase Cournot game in which a forward market is followed by
a standard Cournot game spot market. The good is physically bought and sold in
the spot market. In the ﬁrst phase (forward market), ﬁrms can sell some or all of
their production for delivery in the second phase (spot market). At the end of the
ﬁrst phase, ﬁrms observe the forward market outcome. In the second phase, ﬁrms
compete in quantity over the residual demand. At the end of the second phase, ﬁrms
observe the spot market production and total production of their competitor(s), the
market price, p, and proﬁt pij . For a detailed derivation of the two-phase equilibrium,
see Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007).
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The existence of arbitrage traders in the market will yield forward-spot price
parity, pf = ps = p (q) (where pf (ps) denote the forward-phase (spot-phase) price,
respectively). Arbitrage traders will compete in prices over ﬁrms' short forward
positions and will try to sell them at a proﬁt to buyers in the spot market. In
equilibrium, any price diﬀerences between the two phases will disappear. Another
way to think about forward-spot price parity is that buyers have perfect foresight
and are therefore indiﬀerent between buying in the forward or spot market.
The game can be solved using backward induction. Let f (s) denote total units
sold in the ﬁrst (second) phase, respectively. Although the demand has perfect fore-
sight, the theoretical model assumes that ﬁrms treat their ﬁrst-phase proﬁts as being
unaﬀected by their second-phase production decisions. Given forward positions, ﬁrm
j's proﬁt maximization problem in the spot market game can be written as
max
sj
p (sj , s¬j , f) sj ; j = 1, . . . , J (2.3)
with corresponding ﬁrst order condition
0 = p (·) + ∂p (·)
∂sj
sj ; ∀j (2.4)
With an inverse demand function as given in equation 2.1, the ﬁrst order condition
is
0 = α− f −
J∑
k=1
sk − sj ; ∀j
Simultaneously solving the J best response functions gives ﬁrm j's optimal second
phase production:
sj (f) =
α− f
J + 1
; ∀j (2.5)
which is a best response to any arbitrary level of forward sales commitment. To
obtain the ﬁrst phase equilibrium, the second phase best response functions are
nested in the ﬁrst phase objective function:
max
fj
p
fj , J∑
k 6=j
fk,
J∑
k=1
sk (f)
 (fj + sj (f)) ; ∀j (2.6)
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with corresponding ﬁrst order condition
0 = p (·)
(
1 +
∂sj
∂fj
)
+
∂p
∂q
(
1 +
J∑
k=1
∂sk
∂fj
)
(fj + sj) ; ∀j (2.7)
=
J − 1
J + 1
(α− f)− fj (2.8)
Simultaneously solving the J ﬁrst order conditions and imposing symmetry gives
fj =
J − 1
J2 + 1
α; ∀j (2.9)
The two-phase Cournot equilibrium can be summarized as
ffsj =
J − 1
J2 + 1
α; sfsj =
1
J2 + 1
α; qfsj =
J
J2 + 1
α; pifsj =
J
(J2 + 1)2
α2; ∀j (2.10)
with equilibrium price
pfs =
α
J2 + 1
(2.11)
Note that the Cournot equilibrium output of a J-ﬁrm, two-phase oligopoly equals
the output of a J2-ﬁrm, single-phase oligopoly: qfs (J) = qc
(
J2
)
. To summarize,
in a ﬁnitely repeated setting, the existence of a single forward market increases
quantity competition between ﬁrms which increases market eﬃciency. The following
two hypotheses capture the predictions of the ﬁnitely repeated two-phase game:
Hypothesis 1. Oligopoly markets with a forward market phase yield higher output
(lower prices) on average than oligopoly markets with a spot market phase only.
Hypothesis 2. The market outcome (total output, price, and proﬁt) of a J-ﬁrm,
two-phase oligopoly is equivalent to the market outcome of a J2-ﬁrm, single phase
oligopoly.
Tacit Collusion
Next, consider an inﬁnitely repeated Cournot game where the same ﬁrms compete
repeatedly with each other. According to the Friedman theorem, all ﬁrms jointly
producing the monopoly quantity is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for suf-
ﬁciently high discount rates δ. We assume that when ﬁrms play the cooperative
subgame strategy, they split the monopoly output equally. The stage-game collusive
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outcome can be summarized as
qtcj =
α
2J
; pitcj =
α2
4J
; ptc =
α
2
; ∀j (2.12)
Comparison of the diﬀerent equilibrium proﬁt predictions yields pifsj < pi
c
j < pi
tc
j .
Standard Cournot Game
In deriving the cooperative, subgame perfect equilibrium predictions, we assume
that ﬁrms will cooperate as long as they observe the other ﬁrms playing the cooper-
ation strategy. Once a ﬁrm cheats, ﬁrms will play the stage-game Nash equilibrium
strategy thereafter.
In the single phase Cournot game, ﬁrm j's one-period incentive to deviate from
the collusive strategy (cheating) is
max
qj
(
α− (J − 1) α
2J
− qj
)
qj (2.13)
Firm j's production and proﬁt and the resulting market price are:
qdj =
(J + 1)
4J
α; pidj =
(J + 1)2
16J2
α2; pd =
J + 1
4J
α (2.14)
The cooperative strategy qtc will be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, if the
following condition holds
pidj +
δ
(1− δ)pi
c
j <
1
(1− δ)pi
tc
j , δ ∈ [0, 1] (2.15)
The implied critical discount factor for the existence of the subgame perfect equilib-
rium can be calculated as (
J2 − 1)2
(J + 1)4 − 16J2 < δ (J) (2.16)
Two-Phase Cournot Game
In the following derivation, we generalize Liski and Montero's framework to an
oligopolistic setting with J ﬁrms. For simplicity, we restrict ﬁrms' positions in the
forward market to short positions only (see Liski and Montero (2006) for details
on ﬁrms' holding long positions in the forward market). In the two-phase Cournot
game, several collusive strategies support the subgame perfect equilibrium. Assume
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that, in the cooperative subgame, ﬁrm j sells f tcj = λj · qtcj , λj ∈ [0, 1] units in the
ﬁrst phase and stcj = (1− λj) · qtcj units in the second phase2. The model assumes
that ﬁrms treat their forward market proﬁt as being unaﬀected by their production
decision in the spot market. This implies that ﬁrms' incentives to deviate from the
collusive path are smaller in the spot-phase stage-game if they have forward sales
positions. Therefore, the gains of deviating from the collusive path will never be
greater than the proﬁt from deviating in the single phase stage-game. Further, devi-
ation is more costly in the two-phase game as the sanctioning path is the two-phase
stage-game Cournot equilibrium. These two eﬀects result in a strictly lower critical
discount factor that supports the collusive outcome. Firm j's one-period incentive
to deviate from the collusive strategy in the spot market is3
max
sj
(
α− (J − 1) α
2J
− λj α
2J
− sj
)
sj (2.17)
where λjα/2J = λjq
tc
j denotes ﬁrm j's forward sales expressed in terms of the
collusive amount. Firm j's production and proﬁt and the resulting market price are:
fj = λj
α
2J
; sdj =
(J + 1− λj)
4J
α; pidj = pi
d
j −
λ2j
16J2
α2; p˜d =
(J + 1− λj)
4J
α (2.18)
Note that the one period proﬁt from cheating in the two-phase game is always less
than or equal to the single phase deviating proﬁt. Strategy
{
stcj , f
tc
j
}
denotes a
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy if the following inequality is satisﬁed
pidj +
δ
(1− δ)pi
fs
j <
1
(1− δ)pi
tc
j (2.19)
The left-hand side in equation 2.19 is strictly less than the left-hand side in equation
2.15. The critical discount factor is therefore strictly lower than the critical discount
factor in the single phase game:[
(J + 1)2 − λ2j − 4J
] (
J2 + 1
)2(
(J + 1)2 − λ2j
)
(J2 + 1)2 − 16J3
< δ˜ (λj , J) < δ (J) , ∀λj ∈ [0, 1] .
Note that δ˜ (λj , J) is decreasing in λj . Table 1 summarizes the subgame equilibria
predictions.
2Firms' forward positions do not have to be symmetric (λi 6= λj) in order for the collusive
subgame perfect equilibrium to exist.
3It is never proﬁtable to cheat in the forward market (see Liski and Montero (2006)).
9
The following main hypotheses guide the experimental design. These hypothe-
ses reﬂect the cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium predictions in the inﬁnitely
repeated, two-phase Cournot game.
Hypothesis 3. In an inﬁnitely repeated setting, two-phase oligopoly markets yield
lower output (higher prices) on average than single phase oligopolies.
Hypothesis 4. Firms can sustain the cooperative subgame equilibrium across both
phases (forward and spot market) in inﬁnitely-repeated oligopolies.
Hypothesis 5. In inﬁnitely repeated two-phase oligopolies, ﬁrms that sell forward
are less likely to defect than ﬁrms that have no forward sales position.
[insert Table 1 here]
3 Experimental Design
The objective of the experimental design is to test the strategic eﬀect of forward
sales in an inﬁnitely repeated setting. In order to test for the existence of coop-
erative subgame equilibria, it is important to create a market environment in the
laboratory that gives the predicted collusive equilibria the best chance of occur-
rence. The following main ﬁndings from previous oligopoly experiments contributed
to our design (see Engel (2007) for a comprehensive meta-analysis of oligopoly ex-
periments). First, the larger the number of ﬁrms, the smaller the observed degree
of collusion (see also Huck et al. (2004)). Second, experienced subjects tend to col-
lude more than inexperienced subjects, i.e. learning plays an important role (Huck
et al. (1999)). Third, the better subjects are informed, the more likely they play a
cooperative strategy. Lastly, if subjects play against human buyers, collusion rates
plummet (Engel (2007)).
Our experiment compares a standard duopoly (C2 treatment) to a two-phase
duopoly with a single forward and a single spot market phase (FS2 treatment). A
third, standard three-ﬁrm oligopoly treatment (C3 treatment) allows us to analyze
diﬀerences between the eﬀect of adding one additional competitor to the eﬀect of a
single forward market. Adding one additional competitor serves as a lower bound
on the eﬀect of increased competiton from additional ﬁrms.
Strategy Design
The main design challenge is to implement forward-spot price parity. The underly-
ing theoretical models assume that demand has perfect foresight. However, in the
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laboratory, it is impossible to perfectly predict the decisions that subjects make in
a stage-game. Previous experimental studies that test the pro-competitive predic-
tion (Le Coq and Orzen (2006); Ferreira et al. (2010); Van Koten and Ortmann
(2011)) use a pricing rule which dictates the forward price to equal the spot price
if and only if all ﬁrms play the pro-competitive strategy. This pricing rule intro-
duces price uncertainty and it eliminates all cooperative subgame perfect strategies
in the forward market as the calculated forward price is always less than the collusive
price. Brandts et al. (2008) let human buyers compete over ﬁrms' forward market
positions in a Bertrand game; however, this signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of
collusive outcomes.
Our design automates demand using a computer program. We implement forward-
spot price parity by restricting subjects' quantity choices to a discrete choice set. The
market price is not determined until after the end of the spot phase. This implies
that subjects do not observe their forward proﬁts before making their spot phase
decisions4. Instead, the quantity choices in the spot phase of the stage-game are
calculated as if the spot phase choices do not aﬀect the proﬁts in the forward mar-
ket. The set of limited strategies also decreases unintended eﬀects of inexperienced
subjects and importantly increases the likelihood of collusive outcomes (Holt (1995)).
In the forward phase of the FS2 treatment, subjects have the following two
choices: either selling zero units or selling the stage-game equilibrium forward quan-
tity as predicted by the pro-competitive theory. Notice that the forward quantity is
less than the collusive amount, which admits a collusive strategy across forward and
spot phases. In the spot market (C2 and FS2 treatments), the possible choices are
zero, collusive, Cournot, defecting, and punishing output, which reﬂect pure strate-
gies. In the FS2 treatment, the quantity choices are calculated based on the residual
demand (total demand less forward sales).
We provide subjects with a detailed payoﬀ table that lists all possible outcomes.
Subjects are knowledgable of their own and their competitors' proﬁt in any feasible
stage-game outcome. (A copy of the instructions can be found in Appendix D.)
Further, in all treatments, subjects can perfectly monitor the choices made by their
competitor(s).
4Subjects only observe the forward quantity commitments.
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Demand Speciﬁcation
The demand side is automated and subjects have zero production costs (γ = 0).
The inverse demand is given by
pm,t = max {120− qm,t, 0} (3.1)
where qm,t denotes the total units sold in market m in round t. As stated above,
we strictly impose forward-spot price parity in the FS2 treatment: psm,t = p
f
m,t =
pm,t = 120 − fm,t − sm,t, where fm,t and sm,t respectively denote total units sold
in the forward and spot phase. This assures that the conditions of the game in the
experiment are as close to theory as possible without aﬀecting the testable hypothe-
ses. Importantly, subjects receive the same price for any units sold in either forward
or spot phase. In each round, a subject's total proﬁt is calculated as the product of
their individual total production times the market price.
[insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 lists the diﬀerent strategy choices by treatment. In both duopoly treat-
ments, there are ﬁve output choices in the spot phase stage-game. In the C3 treat-
ment however, the defecting and punishing output quantities are equivalent, qj = 40.
Therefore, subjects could only choose from a set of four diﬀerent quantities in the
C3 treatment. In the FS2 treatment, subjects can play the collusive strategy in two
diﬀerent ways: either selling zero units forward and 30 units in the spot phase or
selling 24 units forward and 6 units in the spot phase, respectively. This yields four
diﬀerent collusive subgame perfect equilibria in the FS2 treatment. Table 3 contrasts
the collusive, Cournot, and defecting outcome predictions for all three treatments.
Notice that selling forward makes the defecting strategy less tempting in the spot
phase of the stage-game in the FS2 treatment.
[insert Table 3 here]
The implied critical discount factors in the experiment are δ = 9/17 in the C2
treatment, δ (λj = 0.8) = 1/9, δ (λj = 0) = 25/97 in the FS2 treatment, and δ = 4/7
in the C3 treatment. The punishing strategy in the stage-game allows subjects
to play a more severe grim strategy than just the Nash-reverting strategy. This
implies lower critical discount factors of δ = 1/9 in the C2 treatment, δ (λj = 0.8) =
9/209, δ (λj = 0) = 1/9 in the FS2 treatment, and δ = 1/4 in the C3 treatment.
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Termination Rule
Our design implements a repeated game with uncertain end, which, according to the
Friedman theorem, allows for several subgame equilibria to exist (Friedman (1971)).
Subjects compete with the same other subject(s) for many rounds (ﬁxed matching),
but they do not know the exact number of rounds until the end of the experimental
session. Normann and Wallace (2012) show that the termination rule in prisoner
dilemma games does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect cooperation but may inﬂuence how co-
operation can be sustained over time and its inﬂuence on end of game eﬀects (see
also Selten and Stoecker (1986)). Further, the authors ﬁnd that the number of
rounds signiﬁcantly increases cooperation rates. The two-phase duopoly game is a
complicated market mechanism; therefore, we refrain from using a stochastic termi-
nation rule with continuation probability to avoid unnecessary confusion of subjects'
comprehension of the mechanism. Initially, we considered two diﬀerent termination
rules: known-end (subjects learn the exact number of rounds at the beginning of the
session) and unknown-end. Speciﬁcally, we employed the known-end termination
rule in one C2 and one C3 session. In comparing outcomes, we ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the unknown-end and known-end C3 sessions. In test-
ing for end of game eﬀects, we ﬁnd that, on average, subjects chose higher outputs
(more competitive strategies) in the ﬁnal round of the known-end C2 session. We
therefore exclude the ﬁnal round observations in the known-end C2 session from the
analysis. Appendix A shows the statistical analysis of the termination rules and end
of game eﬀects in detail.
Procedures
The data was collected in seven experimental sessions at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville in the Spring and Summer semesters in 2012. A total of 144 undergraduate
student subjects participated in the sessions. Each subject participated in one session
only. Each session consisted of 27 rounds5 and lasted between one hour and one hour
30 minutes (the FS2 sessions lasted longer than the Cournot sessions due to the two-
phase format). Subjects earned $23 on average.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously
matched with one (two) other subject(s). Subjects were informed that they will
interact with the same other subject(s) for several rounds. A monitor read the ex-
perimental instructions and explained the computer program to participants. The
5The two known-end termination rule sessions consisted of 25 rounds each.
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monitor thoroughly described the payoﬀ table that accompanied the instructions.
To verify that subjects understood how their earnings were calculated, the computer
program asked each subject four practice questions before the start of the experi-
ment. The computer program also displayed a payoﬀ table in each decision round
that listed all feasible sales combinations along with payoﬀs. In the second phase of
the FS2 treatment, the computer program updated this payoﬀ table conditional on
the sales decisions in the ﬁrst phase.
In each round, each participant had to choose an output amount from a list
on the computer screen. After all participants submitted their sales decisions, the
computer program determined the total sales units and price in each market. (At
the end of the ﬁrst phase in the FS2 treatment, subjects only observed the forward
sales of their competitor and total forward sales in their market.) At the end of
each round, each subject learned the total output of the other subject(s) in their
market, the total market output, the resulting market price, and their proﬁt for that
round. The computer program summarized and updated the market outcomes from
previous rounds in the form of a table that was displayed on the computer screen at
the time subjects submitted their decisions. (Appendix E shows screen shots of the
FS2 treatment.) All treatments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
4 Experimental Results
[insert Figure C.1 here]
Market Eﬃciency
First, we analyze the results in terms of total output and market eﬃciency. Figure
C.1 plots the average total output in each round by treatment. Horizontal lines at
60, 80, 90, and 96 denote respectively the collusive, standard duopoly stage-game
equilibrium, three-ﬁrm stage-game equilibrium, and two-phase duopoly stage-game
equilibrium output. The ﬁgure shows that the average two-phase duopoly output
(black circles) is not diﬀerent from the average standard duopoly output (light gray
diamonds). Further, the average total output in the two-phase duopoly is far less
than the predicted two-phase stage-game equilibrium quantity of 96 units. In both
duopoly treatments, the average total output ﬂuctuates at or below the standard
stage-game equilibrium amount of 80 units. The aggregate three-ﬁrm output (gray
triangles) oscillates around the stage-game equilibrium amount of 90 units. The
graph also indicates that total output in both duopoly treatments is less than in the
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three-ﬁrm treatment. Figures C.4, C.5, and C.6 in Appendix C show the total output
by individual markets. These graphs indicate that outcomes are heterogeneous across
markets. Some markets maintain either the collusive or the standard stage-game
Cournot output for the majority of the rounds. In other markets, total output is
characterized by high volatility.
[insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 lists the average total output (by phase), prices, seller proﬁts, and market
eﬃciency across all rounds by treatment. The average total output in the two-
phase duopoly treatment is not statistically diﬀerent from average total sales in the
standard duopoly treatment. The total quantity in the three-ﬁrm treatment is larger
on average than the average total output in either duopoly treatment. In all three
treatments, average total output is signiﬁcantly greater than the collusive output
(60 units). In the two-phase duopoly treatment, average forward sales (20.70 units)
are signiﬁcantly less than 48 units and spot sales are signiﬁcantly greater than 48
units. Subjects sell signiﬁcantly more units in the spot phase than in the forward
phase (see Table 5 for detailed test statistics).
[insert Table 5 here]
Observations are likely dependent upon each other within a single market (group
of matched subjects) and across time. We account for these potential inter-dependencies
using a standard OLS model with robust standard errors clustered at the market
level. The model tests whether total market output and market eﬃciency diﬀer
across the three treatments. Table 6 presents the estimation results. Speciﬁcation 2
allows for a cubic time trend. Speciﬁcation 3 allows for the cubic time trend to diﬀer
between the two-ﬁrm treatments and for a quadratic time trend in the C3 treatment.
In all three speciﬁcations, total output and eﬃciency in the three-ﬁrm treatment are
signiﬁcantly greater than in either two-ﬁrm treatment. However, the coeﬃcient es-
timate on C2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Statistical signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients on the time trend terms indicates that the chosen speciﬁcations capture
the observed ﬂuctuations across time well. In particular, both two-ﬁrm treatments
exhibit oscillatory patterns. Market eﬃciency in the three-ﬁrm treatment is increas-
ing at a decreasing rate over time.
[insert Table 6 here]
15
These ﬁndings indicate that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in total output
and eﬃciency between the two duopoly treatments. We conclude that
Result 1. In an inﬁnitely repeated setting, market eﬃciency in two-phase duopolies
is not diﬀerent from market eﬃciency in single phase duopolies.
The following two ﬁndings are possible explanations of this result. First, on
average, neither ﬁrm committed to any forward sales in 38% of individual two-phase
duopoly stage-games, which means that subjects faced the single phase Cournot
stage-game in more than one third of individual stage-games. In 20 out of 24 markets,
both ﬁrms avoided forward sales in at least one round. Both ﬁrms sold in the forward
phase in only 24% of all individual market outcomes. Second, as outlined in section
2, several collusive equilibria can be sustained in the two-phase duopoly game. The
following discussion examines the latter conjecture by analyzing strategy choices in
the spot phase of the stage-game.
Strategy Choices
[insert Figure C.2 here]
Figure C.2 contrasts the distributions of chosen (stage-game) strategies in the
duopoly treatments. Standard normality tests suggest that both distributions have
a positive skew. Subjects chose the collusive and Cournot (stage-game) strategies
most frequently in both treatments. Whereas the diﬀerence between the collusive
and Cournot strategies is not signiﬁcant in either treatment (Wilcoxon matched
pairs, zFS2 = 1.23, pFS2 = 0.22, zC2 = 0.74, pC2 = 0.46), all other diﬀerences
between strategies are signiﬁcant at the 1% level within each treatment. In both
two-ﬁrm treatments, comparing the frequency of chosen strategies results in the
following order: collude, Cournot > defect > punish > zero. The chart in Figure
C.2 also shows that subjects chose the collusive strategy more frequently in the
FS2 treatment than in the C2 treatment. Further, sellers chose the defective and
competitive strategies less frequently in the FS2 treatment than in the C2 treatment.
However, these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant (all strategies jointly: Kruskal-Wallis
test, χ2 = 0.92, p = 0.34; individual strategies: test of proportions with p-values
ranging from 0.66 to 0.96). Note that decisions in the experimental markets are very
heterogeneous. (Figures C.7, C.8, and C.9 in Appendix C show the distribution of
chosen strategies by market.)
[insert Table 7 here]
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As a robustness check, we jointly test whether there are diﬀerences in distribution
of chosen (stage-game) strategies in a multinomial logit model with standard errors
clustered at the market level. Table 7 reports the estimation results. The coeﬃcient
estimate on the C2 indicator variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for all
strategies, which conﬁrms that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in distribution
between the C2 and FS2 treatment. An interesting result is that sellers chose the
defective strategy less often in later rounds relative to the collusive strategy. Also,
in both treatments, sellers chose the zero output strategy (dominated strategy) less
often in later rounds.
[insert Figure C.3 here]
Figure C.3 shows the distribution of strategies in the C3 treatment. Sellers chose
the Cournot strategy most frequently. However, the diﬀerence between collusive
and Cournot strategies is not signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon matched pairs, z = −1.58, p =
0.11). Although subjects did not choose the collusive strategy signiﬁcantly more
often than the defective strategy (z = 0.13, p = 0.90), they chose the Cournot
strategy signiﬁcantly more often than the defective strategy (z = 1.97, p = 0.05).
We do not test for diﬀerences in strategy distribution between the C3 and the duopoly
treatments as the choice set in the C3 treatment consists of four choices only.
[insert Table 8 here]
Next, we focus on the two-phase duopoly treatment only. To analyze how for-
ward sales aﬀect the output decisions in the spot phase, we test for diﬀerences in
chosen strategies in the spot phase of the stage-game conditional on the outcome
in the forward phase. Table 8 reports the estimation results of a multinomial logit
model that allows for a linear time trend. The binary variables 'Self Sold Forward',
'Competitor Sold Forward' and 'Self·Competitor' uniquely describe the four possi-
ble forward market outcomes. There are no observable diﬀerences between sellers
choosing either the collusive or the Cournot strategy conditional on the forward mar-
ket outcome. However importantly, subjects were less likely to choose the defective
strategy if they sold in the forward market phase. Based on the marginal eﬀect,
ﬁrms that hold forward positions are 15.7% less likely to defect in the spot market
relative to the collusive strategy. This ﬁnding indicates that a ﬁrm can commit to
the collusive strategy more decidedly by selling forward. The following two results
summarize the ﬁndings of the two-phase duopoly treatment:
17
Result 2. In duopolies with a single forward market opening, the collusive outcome
can be sustained across both phases.
Result 3. A single forward market opening can soften competition in duopoly mar-
kets.
Allowing subjects to play the punishing strategy (i.e. ﬁrms in a market produce
an equal share of the maximum demand) leads to behavioral phenomena such as
negative reciprocity. Some subjects play a collusive strategy in early rounds. Their
competitors, however, play the defective strategy repeatedly early in the supergame6.
Subjects then reciprocate by choosing the punishing output in later rounds. We
observe these patterns in several markets in both duopoly treatments. This behavior
indicates that the punishing strategy is a viable grim strategy. The main results are
unaﬀected by this behavioral eﬀect.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this article, we have studied the strategic eﬀect of forward sales on market eﬃ-
ciency and ﬁrms' output choices in inﬁnitely repeated experimental duopoly markets.
Although there is considerable heterogeneity in market outcomes within each treat-
ment, we obtained the following robust results. First, a forward market does not act
like additional competitors in an inﬁnitely repeated setting. Second, several collu-
sive equilibria can be maintained in the presence of forward markets. Although we
did not discover any diﬀerences in market eﬃciency between duopoly markets with
and without forward sales, we found evidence that forward sales commitments can
strengthen collusion as the defective strategy becomes less proﬁtable in the spot-
market. In our experiment, the collusive eﬀect outweighed the increased quantity
competition eﬀect.
The experimental design in this article diﬀers from previous experimental studies
that test the strategic motive of forward contracts. We create a market environment
in the laboratory that increases the likelihood of observing collusive outcomes. To
facilitate cooperation, we use a ﬁxed matching protocol with an unknown-end termi-
nation rule. Our design permits subjects to play several cooperative subgame per-
fect strategies and we impose strict forward-spot price parity to eliminate possible
risk hedging motives. We achieve forward-spot price parity by restricting subjects'
6A supergame refers to several consecutive rounds of the same stage-game in a group of matched
sellers
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quantity choices to a discrete choice set. These design features support four collu-
sive equilibria in the forward market duopoly treatment that were not supported in
previous experimental work.
The results of this article can assist antitrust authorities in mitigating market
power in oligopolies that are characterized by few ﬁrms that interact repeatedly. A
good example is the wholesale electricity industry: few sellers, homogeneous products
that cannot be stored economically at a large scale7, and sound forward markets.
This article conﬁrms that merely requiring electricity generators to sell forward, with
the intent to limit their market power, can have the opposite eﬀect as forward sales
can strengthen collusive outcomes. Without strict regulation, two ways to mitigate
market power in oligopolies are incentivizing entry and introducing forward markets.
The results of this article provide evidence that incentivizing entry can be a superior
market mechanism to forward markets.
7Two diﬀerent spot markets are therefore independent markets and standard storage-based ar-
bitrage arguments do not apply.
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A Termination Rule
We count each market as a single observation to account for possible interdependence
of observations within a single market. The average chosen strategy in the known-end
C2 treatment is lower (1.74) than the average strategy in the unknown-end treatment
(2.08). This diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −1.04, p =
0.30). There is no observable diﬀerence in average chosen strategies between the two
diﬀerent termination rules in the C3 treatment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −0.17,
p = 0.87).
Next, we test for changes in subjects' decisions at the end of the game by compar-
ing chosen strategies in a short period at the end of the game to chosen strategies in
10 prior rounds. Speciﬁcally, in the known- (unknown-) end termination treatments,
we compare the average chosen strategies in a market in rounds 14-23 (16-25) to
the average strategies in rounds 24-25 (26-27), respectively. Counting each market
as a single observation, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distri-
bution of chosen strategies between the unknown-end C2 treatment, the known-
and unknown-end C3 treatments, and the FS2 treatment (matched-pairs Wilcoxon
signed-rank test with p-values ranging from 0.21 - 0.97). Although not signiﬁcant,
note that average chosen strategies are lower in the last two rounds in both C3 ter-
mination rule treatments. In the known-end C2 treatment, however, the average
chosen strategy is signiﬁcantly greater in the last two rounds compared to the 10
rounds prior (matched pairs Wilcoxon, z = −2.86, p = 0.004). Comparing average
chosen strategies in rounds 15-24 (17-26) to average strategies in the ﬁnal round
yields similar results.
Average chosen strategies in the known-end C2 treatment are lower than average
strategies in the unknown-end C2 treatment. Therefore, we test whether average
chosen strategies in round 24 of the known-end C2 treatment diﬀer from average
strategies in rounds 18-27 in the unknown-end C2 treatment: we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in average chosen strategies (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −0.56, p =
0.58). Based on these results, we drop the ﬁnal round from the known-end C2 data
and pool unknown- and known-end termination rule sessions.
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B Tables
Table 1: Theoretical Market Outcome Predictions
f s q p pij
Single Phase Subgame - JJ+1α
J
J+1α
1
J+1α
1
(J+1)2
α2
Two-Phase Subgame J(J−1)J2+1 α
J
J2+1α
J2
J2+1α
1
J2+1α
J
(J2+1)2
α2
Cooperative Subgame λ2α
(1−λ)
2 α
1
2α
1
2α
1
4Jα
2
Note: In the single phase stage-game: λ = 0. In the two-phase stage-game: λ ∈ [0, 1].
Table 2: Sales Choices by Phase, by Treatment
fj sj
C2 - {0, 30, 40, 45, 60}
FS2 {0, 24} {0, (30− fj) , (120− f) /3, (90− fj) /2, (120− f) /2}
C3 - {0, 20, 30, 40}
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Table 3: Collusive, Cournot, and Defecting Outcome Predictions by Treatment
fj sj qj f s q p pij Eﬃciency
C
ol
lu
d
e C2 - 30 30 - 60 60 60 1,800 75%
FS2 {0, 24} {30, 6} 30 {0, 24, 48} {60, 36, 12} 60 60 1,800 75%
C3 - 20 20 - 60 60 60 1,200 75%
C
ou
rn
ot C2 - 40 40 - 80 80 40 1,600 89%
FS2 24 24 48 48 48 96 24 1,152 96%
C3 - 30 30 - 90 90 30 900 94%
D
ef
ec
t C2 - 45 45 - 75 75 45 2,025 86%
FS2 0 45 45 {0, 24} {75, 51} 75 45 2,025 86%
FS2 24 33 57 {24, 48} {63, 39} 87 33 1,881 92%
C3 - 40 40 - 80 80 40 1,600 89%
Note: The defectiving outcomes are calculated based on the assumption that the other ﬁrm(s) play
the collusive strategy.
Table 4: Summary Statistics, Average Market Outcomes by Treatment
fj sj qj f s q p pij Eﬃciency
C2 - 37.61 37.61 - 75.33 75.21 44.79 1,572.79 84.52%
(5.59) (5.59) (14.94) (10.75) (10.75) (204.72) (6.52%)
FS2 10.35 28.08 38.43 20.70 56.17 76.87 43.13 1,522.62 85.20%
(7.99) (8.00) (4.99) (13.42) (13.67) (8.87) (8.87) (184.67) (5.34%)
C3 - 29.75 29.75 - 89.22 89.24 30.76 845.43 91.98%
(3.75) (3.75) (14.51) (8.42) (8.42) (175.75) (3.92%)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Each market counts as a single observation to control
for possible correlation within a market.
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Table 5: z-Statistics of Wilcoxon rank-sum and matched-pairs tests (H0: row variable
= column variable, Ha: row variable 6= column variable)
48 60 80 90 96 qC2 sFS2 fFS2 qFS2 qC3
qC2 - 4.04*** -1.66* - - - - - -0.54 -3.87***
0.00 0.10 0.59 0.00
sFS2 2.54** -1.37 - - - - - 4.09*** - -
0.01 0.17 0.00
fFS2 -4.29*** - - - - - -4.09*** - - -
0.00 0.00
qFS2 - 4.14*** -1.16 - -4.29*** 0.54 - - - -3.99***
0.00 0.25 0.00 0.59 0.00
qC3 - 3.52*** - -0.49 - 3.87*** - - 3.99*** -
0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00
Note: p-values given beneath. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively. Each market enters the tests as a single observation to control for possible
correlation within a market.
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Table 6: Eﬀect of Treatment on Total Output and Eﬃciency
Output Eﬃciency
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant 76.87*** 72.11*** 73.47*** 85.20%*** 82.49%*** 83.77%***
(1.79) (2.38) (3.13) (1.08%) (1.54%) (2.01%)
C2 -1.54 -1.50 -4.74 -0.61% -0.58% -3.62%
(2.80) (2.80) (4.34) (1.69%) (1.69%) (2.98%)
C3 12.35*** 12.37*** 8.73** 6.76%*** 6.77%*** 5.18%**
(2.75) (2.75) (4.10) (1.45%) (1.45%) (2.52%)
Round - 1.30** - - 0.82%*** -
(0.53) (0.31%)
Round2 - -0.09** - - -0.06%** -
(0.04) (0.02%)
Round3 - 2.0E-03* - - 0.0014%** -
(1.1E-03) (0.0006%)
C2·Round - - 2.09*** - - 1.39%***
(0.77) (0.52%)
C2·Round2 - - -0.17** - - -0.11%***
(0.06) (0.04%)
C2·Round3 - - 0.004** - - 0.003%**
(0.002) (0.001%)
FS2·Round - - 1.54 - - 0.77%
(0.95) (0.53%)
FS2·Round2 - - -0.14* - - -0.07%
(0.08) (0.04%)
FS2·Round3 - - 0.003* - - 0.002%*
(0.002) (0.001%)
C3·Round - - 1.02*** - - 0.44%*
(0.38) (0.21%)
C3·Round2 - - -0.03** - - -0.012%*
(0.01) (0.006%)
F 13.65 7.26 4.36 15.11 7.45 4.30
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12
Note: N = 1, 682 (64 markets with 24 (25) to 27 observations per market). FS2 is the control
group. Standard errors in parantheses. Signiﬁcance of coeﬃcient estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 7: Eﬀect of Type of Two-Firm Treatment on Strategy
Zero Cournot Defect Punish
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
Constant -1.93*** -0.31 -0.79*** -2.13***
(0.33) (0.28) (0.29) (0.37)
C2 -1.09** -1.48%*** 0.09 0.93% 0.17 1.64% 0.34 1.72%
(0.53) (0.63%) (0.41) (7.39%) (0.44) (4.41%) (0.52) (2.75%)
Round -0.081*** -0.09%*** -2.1E-03 0.12% -2.6E-02* -0.32%** -3.2E-05 0.04%
(0.022) (0.03%) (1.2E-02) (0.25%) (1.5E-02) (0.15%) (2.1E-02) (0.12%)
Log-Likelihood = −3, 143.62; Wald χ2 = 35.82; N = 2, 520 (48 markets)
Note: FS2 is the control group. Base strategy is collude. The multinomial logit model estimates a
set of coeﬃcients for each strategy other than the base strategy. Coeﬃcient estimates for diﬀerent
strategies are shown across columns. Standard errors in parantheses. Signiﬁcance of coeﬃcient
estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 8: Eﬀect of Forward Market Outcome on Spot Market Strategy Choice
Zero Cournot Defect Punish
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Eﬀect
Constant -3.00*** -0.33 -0.56 -3.20***
(0.55) (0.46) (0.44) (0.60)
Self Sold 0.75 1.62% 0.02 3.21% -1.40** -15.70%*** 1.37** 7.46%**
Forward (0.76) (1.37%) (0.57) (10.13%) (0.57) (4.56%) (0.67) (3.57%)
Competitor 0.62 0.90% -0.15 -9.35% 0.53 4.87% 1.97*** 10.29%***
Sold Forward (0.70) (1.12%) (0.54) (9.50%) (0.52) (3.83%) (0.56) (2.63%)
Self·Competitor 0.52 0.68% 0.56 14.04% 0.11 -0.79% -1.75** -5.98%***
(0.93) (1.57%) (0.81) (15.27%) (0.82) (5.77%) (0.86) (1.70%)
Round -0.068** -0.11%*** -0.007 0.03% -0.031 -0.28% -0.013 -0.02%
(0.028) (0.04%) (0.016) (0.33%) (0.020) (0.19%) (0.030) (0.12%)
Log-Likelihood = −1, 555.16; Wald χ2 = 193.13; N = 1, 296 (24 markets)
Note: Control group is no forward sales. Base strategy is collude. The multinomial logit model
estimates a set of coeﬃcients for each strategy other than the base strategy. Coeﬃcient estimates
for diﬀerent strategies are shown across columns. Standard errors in parantheses. Signiﬁcance of
coeﬃcient estimates at the 1% and 5% level is denoted by *** and **, respectively.
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C Figures
Figure C.1: Average Total Output per Round, All Treatments
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Figure C.2: Percentage of Strategies by Two-Firm Treatment
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Figure C.3: Percentage of Strategies in C3 Treatment
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Figure C.4: Total Output per Round, C2 Treatment, All Markets
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Note: Markets 1-12 (13-24) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
30
Figure C.5: Total Output per Round, FS2 Treatment, All Markets
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Note: Markets 25-36 (37-48) in Summer (Spring) session.
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Figure C.6: Total Output per Round, C3 Treatment, All Markets
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Note: Markets 49-59 (60-64) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
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Figure C.7: Proportion of Strategies with 95% Conf. Int., C2 Treatment, All Markets
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Note: Markets 1-12 (13-24) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
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Figure C.8: Proportion of Strategies with 95% Conf. Int., FS2 Treatment, All
Markets
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Note: Markets 25-36 (37-48) in Summer (Spring) session.
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Figure C.9: Proportion of Strategies with 95% Conf. Int., C3 Treatment, All Markets
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Note: Markets 49-59 (60-64) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
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D Instructions
D.1 Single Phase Treatment
Brackets, [], denote diﬀerences between two-ﬁrm and three-ﬁrm instructions.
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. If you
follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At
the end of today's session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
Overview
The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number of
rounds until the end of the experiment. At the beginning of the session, you will be
randomly and anonymously matched with one [two] other person[s]. The one [two]
other person[s] with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round, but
you will not learn the identity of the other person[s]. The decisions that you and the
other [two] person[s] make will determine the dollar earnings for each of you.
In this session, you are a quantity-setting seller of a hypothetical good. You will earn
proﬁts by selling units of the good. At the beginning of each round, you will be asked
how many units of the good you want to sell in that round. You make a decision
by selecting a number from a list on your computer. The possible choices are 0, 30,
40, 45, or 60 [0, 20, 30, or 40] units. At the same time that you are submitting how
many units you want to sell, the other [two] seller[s] in your 2[3]-seller market will
also submit how many units he/she [they] wants to sell. None of you will be able to
see the decisions of the other [two] seller[s] in your market until both [all three] of
you have submitted your decisions. Note that once submitted, all decisions are ﬁnal
and cannot be changed. At the end of each round, you will see how many units you
sold, how many units the other seller[s] in your 2[3]-seller market sold, how many
total units were sold, the price for that round, and your earnings for that round.
Earnings are denoted in tokens and each unit has a cost of 0 (zero) tokens to you.
Price Calculation
Buyers are automated by the computer program. The market price at the end of a
round will be determined by the units sold by both [all three] sellers in your 2[3]-
seller market in a round. At the end of a round, the computer will calculate the
market price (in tokens) as follows:
Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage
In general, the higher the number of total units sold the lower the price and vice
versa. If the total amount of units sold across both stages is greater than or equal
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to 120, the price will be zero. Hint: The number of total sales in your 2[3]-seller
market can never be greater than 120 in any round.
Earnings
You will earn proﬁts by selling units. The proﬁt for any unit sold is the selling
price in that round. Your total earnings (in tokens) in a round will be calculated as
follows:
Round Earnings = Price ·Your Total Units Sold
Your total earnings in this part of the experiment will be your total earnings from
all rounds. At the end of the ﬁrst experiment, tokens will be converted into U.S.
dollars at a rate of 1,800 tokens per U.S. dollar.
The following table shows your possible earnings in each round based on the sales
choices that you and the other seller in your 2[3]-seller market make:
Other Seller's Total Units Sold
Y
o
u
r
U
n
it
s
S
o
ld 0 30 40 45 60
0 0 0 0 0 0
30 2,700 1,800 1,500 1,350 900
40 3,200 2,000 1,600 1,400 800
45 3,375 2,025 1,575 1,350 675
60 3,600 1,800 1,200 900 0
Other Two Sellers' Total Units Sold
Y
o
u
r
U
n
it
s
S
o
ld 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 2,000 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400
30 2,700 2,100 1,800 1,500 1,200 900 600 300
40 3,200 2,400 2,000 1,600 1,200 800 400 0
Before making any ﬁnal decisions, you will be asked to answer 4 (four) practice
questions to verify that you understand how your earnings are determined.
Computer Program
At the top of your screen, you will see a payout table similar to the table above (gray
frame). In the middle of your screen, you will see the actual decision panel (orange
frame). You will make a decision by selecting how many units you want to sell from
the list. Once you click the Submit button, your sales decision cannot be changed
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and will be ﬁnal. At the end of each round, the computer will display your sales, the
other [two] seller's sales, the total sales in your 3-seller market, the price, and your
proﬁt for that round. The computer will keep track of your sales, the other seller's
sales, the price, and your earnings in each round. This information will be displayed
in a table at the bottom of your computer screen (gray frame). The computer will
also update your total earnings which will be displayed at the top of your screen (in
tokens).
Summary
• The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number
of rounds until the end of the experiment.
• You will be randomly matched with one [two] other seller[s]. The one [two]
other seller[s] with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round!
• You will earn proﬁts by selling units. The proﬁt for any unit sold is the selling
price in that round.
• The price that you will receive for each unit you sell in a round is calculated
as follows: Price = 120− Total Units Sold
• Your earnings will be the sum of your earnings from all rounds.
If you have a question at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand!
One of the monitors will come to your station and answer it in private.
D.2 Two-Phase Treatment
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. If you
follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At
the end of today's session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
Overview
The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number of
rounds until the end of the experiment. At the beginning of the session, you will be
randomly and anonymously matched with one other person. The one other person
with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round, but you will not
learn the identity of the other person. The decisions that you and the other person
make will determine the dollar earnings for each of you.
In this session, you are a quantity-setting seller of a hypothetical good. You will
earn proﬁts by selling units of the good. Each round consists of two stages (A and
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B). At the beginning of each stage, you will be asked how many units of the good
you want to sell in that stage. You make a decision by selecting a number from a
list on your computer. (In stage A, the possible choices are 0 and 24 units. In stage
B, you will have ﬁve choices which depend on the decisions in stage A.) At the same
time that you are submitting how many units you want to sell, the other seller in
your 2-seller market will also submit how many units he/she wants to sell. None of
you will be able to see the decisions of the other seller in your market until both of
you have submitted your decisions. Note that once submitted, all decisions are ﬁnal
and cannot be changed.
At the end of stage A, you will see how many units you sold, how many units the
other seller in your 2-seller market sold and how many units were sold in total in
Stage A. At the end of stage B, you will see how many units you sold, how many
units the other seller in your 2-seller market sold, the price for that round, and your
earnings for that round. Earnings are denoted in tokens and each unit has a cost of
0 (zero) tokens to you.
Price Calculation
Buyers are automated by the computer program. The market price at the end of a
round will be determined by the units sold by both sellers in your 2-seller market in
a round in stage A and stage B combined. At the end of a round, the computer will
calculate the market price (in tokens) as follows:
Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage A− Total Units Sold Stage B
In general, the higher the number of total units sold the lower the price and vice
versa. If the total amount of units sold across both stages is greater than or equal to
120, the price will be zero. Hint: The number of total sales in your 2-seller market
can never be greater than 120 in any round.
Earnings
You will earn proﬁts by selling units. The proﬁt for any unit sold is the selling
price in that round. Your total earnings (in tokens) in a round will be calculated as
follows:
Round Earnings = Price ·Your Total Units Sold
Note: You will receive the same price for any unit sold in stage A and/or stage B.
Your total earnings in the experiment will be your total earnings from all rounds.
At the end of the ﬁrst experiment, tokens will be converted into U.S. dollars at a
rate of 1,800 tokens per U.S. dollar.
Attached is a table that shows your possible earnings in each round based on the sales
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choices that you and the other seller in your 2-seller market make in both stages.
Before making any ﬁnal decisions, you will be asked to answer 4 (four) practice
questions to verify that you understand how your earnings are determined.
Computer Program
At the top of your screen, you will see a payoﬀ table similar to the table above (gray
frame). In the middle of your screen, you will see the actual decision panel (orange
frame). You will make a decision by selecting how many units you want to sell from
the list. Once you click the Submit button, your sales decision cannot be changed
and will be ﬁnal.
At the end of each round, the computer will display your sales, the other seller's
sales, the total sales in your 2-seller market, the price, and your earnings for that
round. The computer will keep track of your sales, the price, and your earnings in
each round. This information will be displayed in a table at the bottom of your
computer screen (gray frame). The computer will also update your total earnings
which will be displayed at the top of your screen (in tokens).
Summary
• The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number
of rounds until the end of the experiment.
• You will be randomly matched with one other seller. The one other seller with
whom you will be matched will be the same in every round!
• You will earn proﬁts by selling units in either stage A, or stage B, or both
stages. The proﬁt for any unit sold is the selling price in that round.
• The price that you will receive for each unit you sell in a round is calculated as
follows: Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage A− Total Units Sold Stage B
• Your earnings will be the sum of your earnings from all rounds.
If you have a question at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand!
One of the monitors will come to your station and answer it in private.
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My
Sales
A
Other
Seller's
Sales A
My
Sales
B
Other
Seller's
Sales B
Total
Sales
Price My
Proﬁt
Other
Seller's
Proﬁt
0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0
0 0 0 30 30 90 0 2,700
0 0 0 40 40 80 0 3,200
0 0 0 45 45 75 0 3,375
0 0 0 60 60 60 0 3,600
0 0 30 0 30 90 2,700 0
0 0 30 30 60 60 1,800 1,800
0 0 30 40 70 50 1,500 2000
0 0 30 45 75 45 1,350 2025
0 0 30 60 90 30 900 1800
0 0 40 0 40 80 3,200 0
0 0 40 30 70 50 2,000 1,500
0 0 40 40 80 40 1,600 1,600
0 0 40 45 85 35 1,400 1,575
0 0 40 60 100 20 800 1,200
0 0 45 0 45 75 3,375 0
0 0 45 30 75 45 2,025 1,350
0 0 45 40 85 35 1,575 1,400
0 0 45 45 90 30 1,350 1,350
0 0 45 60 105 15 675 900
0 0 60 0 60 60 3,600 0
0 0 60 30 90 30 1,800 900
0 0 60 40 100 20 1,200 800
0 0 60 45 105 15 900 675
0 0 60 60 120 0 0 0
Table continued on next page.
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My
Sales
A
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My
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B
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Seller's
Sales B
Total
Sales
Price My
Proﬁt
Other
Seller's
Proﬁt
0 24 0 0 24 96 0 2,304
0 24 0 6 30 90 0 2,700
0 24 0 32 56 64 0 3,584
0 24 0 33 57 63 0 3,591
0 24 0 48 72 48 0 3,456
0 24 30 0 54 66 1,980 1,584
0 24 30 6 60 60 1,800 1,800
0 24 30 32 86 34 1,020 1,904
0 24 30 33 87 33 990 1,881
0 24 30 48 102 18 540 1,296
0 24 32 0 56 64 2,048 1,536
0 24 32 6 62 58 1,856 1,740
0 24 32 32 88 32 1,024 1,792
0 24 32 33 89 31 992 1,767
0 24 32 48 104 16 512 1,152
0 24 45 0 69 51 2,295 1,224
0 24 45 6 75 45 2,025 1,350
0 24 45 32 101 19 855 1,064
0 24 45 33 102 18 810 1,026
0 24 45 48 117 3 135 216
0 24 48 0 72 48 2,304 1,152
0 24 48 6 78 42 2,016 1,260
0 24 48 32 104 16 768 896
0 24 48 33 105 15 720 855
0 24 48 48 120 0 0 0
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Proﬁt
24 0 0 0 24 96 2,304 0
24 0 0 30 54 66 1,584 1,980
24 0 0 32 56 64 1,536 2,048
24 0 0 45 69 51 1,224 2,295
24 0 0 48 72 48 1,152 2,304
24 0 6 0 30 90 2,700 0
24 0 6 30 60 60 1,800 1,800
24 0 6 32 62 58 1,740 1,856
24 0 6 45 75 45 1,350 2,025
24 0 6 48 78 42 1,260 2,016
24 0 32 0 56 64 3,584 0
24 0 32 30 86 34 1,904 1,020
24 0 32 32 88 32 1,792 1,024
24 0 32 45 101 19 1,064 855
24 0 32 48 104 16 896 768
24 0 33 0 57 63 3,591 0
24 0 33 30 87 33 1,881 990
24 0 33 32 89 31 1,767 992
24 0 33 45 102 18 1,026 810
24 0 33 48 105 15 855 720
24 0 48 0 72 48 3,456 0
24 0 48 30 102 18 1,296 540
24 0 48 32 104 16 1,152 512
24 0 48 45 117 3 216 135
24 0 48 48 120 0 0 0
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24 24 0 0 48 72 1,728 1,728
24 24 6 0 54 66 1,980 1,584
24 24 24 0 72 48 2,304 1,152
24 24 33 0 81 39 2,223 936
24 24 36 0 84 36 2,160 864
24 24 0 6 54 66 1,584 1,980
24 24 6 6 60 60 1,800 1,800
24 24 24 6 78 42 2,016 1,260
24 24 33 6 87 33 1,881 990
24 24 36 6 90 30 1,800 900
24 24 0 24 72 48 1,152 2,304
24 24 6 24 78 42 1,260 2,016
24 24 24 24 96 24 1,152 1,152
24 24 33 24 105 15 855 720
24 24 36 24 108 12 720 576
24 24 0 33 81 39 936 2,223
24 24 6 33 87 33 990 1,881
24 24 24 33 105 15 720 855
24 24 33 33 114 6 342 342
24 24 36 33 117 3 180 171
24 24 0 36 84 36 864 2,160
24 24 6 36 90 30 900 1,800
24 24 24 36 108 12 576 720
24 24 33 36 117 3 171 180
24 24 36 36 120 0 0 0
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E Screen-shots
Figure E.1: Decision Stage A, FS2 Treatment
Figure E.2: Decision Stage B, FS2 Treatment
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